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In two experiments (N = 162; N = 192) participants’ reactions to identity theft are 
examined. Identity theft is defined as a situation in which a person intentionally 
appropriates distinctive characteristics of another person’s identity. Identity theft 
represents a moral violation against an individual's claim to display a public identity. 
Participants reported greater negative reactions when imagining another person 
appropriating many, but not one, self-characteristics. Moral appraisals of the theft 
(i.e., illegitimacy, intention to harm) mediated the relationship between the increase 
in number of self-characteristics copied and anger expressed by participants 
(Experiment 1). When the thief acknowledged the theft, anger was attenuated. The 
perception that the harm was not intentional and the perceived honesty of the copier 
mediated the relationship between the thief acknowledging the theft and participants’ 
anger (Experiment 2). The implications of the present findings for past identity theft 





Since the publication of William James’ Principles of Psychology (1890), 
there has been extensive research examining aspects of self and identity. For example, 
there are over 150,000 abstracts concerning the “self” indexed in PsycInfo (Leary & 
Tangney, 2003), and 110,000 abstracts for “identity.” Given the numerous papers and 
books on topics such as self-esteem, self-concept, and ego-threat, it may be difficult 
to imagine any area of identity that has not received empirical attention. Indeed, 
research has examined threats to one’s personal self via insults (Bushman & 
Baumeister, 1998), negative feedback (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982), and 
interpersonal rejection (see Leary, 2001). Threats to the public self have also been 
examined including associations with groups that are unsuccessful (Cialdini, Borden, 
Thorne, Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976), embarrassment (Leary, Landel, & Patton, 
1996), and public failure (Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985). The key difference 
between each type of threat (to the public or private self) is whether others’ 
perceptions of one’s image is damaged.  
Public Identity 
Public identity is that which is observable by others and makes one feel like a 
unique individual (Buss, 2001). In other words, an individual’s public identity 
consists of characteristics that distinguish the person from others (Brewer, 1991; 
Jarymowicz, 1998; Simon, 1998; Turner & Onorato, 1998) and makes one feel 
unique (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959, Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). 
Theorists have converged on the notion that individuals seek to engender and 
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maintain a unique public identity that others recognize (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; 
Goffman, 1959, Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980). The active management 
of one’s identity is meant to control how others view oneself. Indeed, one’s public 
identity could be defined as the impression others form and hold about oneself 
(Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980).  
Individuals actively produce their desired personal identity and seek 
validation from others regarding that identity (Baumeister, 1986; Brown, 1998; 
Cooley, 1902/1964; James, 1890; Jones, 1964; Mead, 1934; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, 
& Solomon, 1997; Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999). The feedback or 
reflections that others then give back to the individual can shape the individual’s 
identity (Leary, 1995; Tice & Wallace, 2003). In other words, individuals display 
their personal identity and look for validation of that identity from others, which can 
then be incorporated into the self-concept. A threat to one’s public identity is that 
which threatens the impressions others have of oneself. The present paper describes 
two studies regarding a new type of threat to one’s public identity termed identity 
theft.  
Identity Theft 
Identity theft is defined as a situation in which another person intentionally 
copies distinctive and valued characteristics of another person’s public identity. I 
suggest that identity theft requires that the thief publicly display the characteristics. In 
a series of studies, Reysen, Landau, and Branscombe (2009) examined the emotional, 
cognitive, and behavioral effects of identity theft. In Experiment 1, participants were 
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asked to imagine that they met another person (same gender as the participant) at a 
party, and this other person commented that they liked the participant’s shirt. 
Participants were then asked to imagine that they saw the other person a few days 
later on campus and that other person was wearing the same shirt as the participant. 
Participants in a second condition read about the other person copying the shirt as 
well as the participant’s hairstyle. Participants in a third condition read about the 
other person copying the shirt, hairstyle, and personality. In effect, the three 
conditions represented an increasing number of self-characteristics being copied by 
the other person. The results showed that when only one characteristic of the self was 
copied, participants felt flattered and liked the copier. However, when more than one 
self-characteristic was appropriated, participants viewed the theft as intentional, felt 
angry, rated the thief negatively (i.e., as hypocritical, dishonest, and not likeable), and 
endorsed confronting the thief. Additionally in Experiment 1, participants grew 
angrier as more characteristics were stolen from them, and this was mediated by 
participants’ perception that the theft was intentional. Anger mediated the relationship 
between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and endorsement of 
confrontation with the copier. 
Thus, in this research, Experiment 1 illuminated the importance of anger 
following an identity theft incident and was therefore the main dependent variable in 
subsequent experiments. The attribution of intention to steal was also critical. 
Participants perceived the copying to be intentional to a greater extent when two and 
three characteristics were copied compared to only one characteristic. Additionally, 
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the attribution of intention to steal mediated the relationship between the increase in 
the number of characteristics copied and the experience of anger. Experiment 1 also 
demonstrated that identity theft threatened participants’ public image negatively when 
more than one self-characteristic was copied. In effect, when two or three 
characteristics were copied, participants viewed the intentional theft as negative, felt 
angry, and endorsed confrontation with the copier.  
In additional experiments by Reysen et al. (2009), participants read about the 
copier appropriating all three characteristics (i.e., shirt, hairstyle, and personality). 
Identity theft was found to threaten participants’ public identity evidenced by less 
anger when a third-party validated the participant’s identity (Experiment 2), but more 
anger when a third-party invalidated the participant’s identity (Experiment 3). Thus, 
when identity validation supported the participants’ presentation of their public 
identity, participants felt less angry, and when the feedback did not validate the 
participants’ public image they expressed more anger. The notion that identity theft is 
a threat to one’s public identity was further addressed by providing participants with a 
chance to focus on internal and unchanging self-characteristics before the identity 
threat, which buffered participants against a subsequently encountered identity theft 
incident (Experiment 4).  
Overall, the past experiments highlighted the notion that individuals are 
motivated to create and foster an identity that others concur with (Goffman, 1959; 
Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980), and they will seek affirmation (Becker, 1971) and 
verification of consistency (Erikson, 1950; Swann, 1983, 1999) of that identity. 
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Although the four experiments conducted by Reysen et al. (2009) provided a great 
deal of knowledge concerning the phenomenon of identity theft, there are still 
unanswered questions. For example, is the anger felt by participants due to a moral 
violation, or alternatively, is it due to the loss of control over one’s identity?  
Similarity or Intention? 
Byrne (1971) provides considerable support for the idea that greater similarity 
with another person predicts greater liking. For example, husbands and wives show a 
strong positive correlation between their opinions and political preferences; 
participants rate strangers who are similar as more likeable regardless of whether the 
interaction is face-to-face or the other is not physically present. Based on such 
findings, Byrne (1971) argues that the more similar one is to another person the 
greater the interpersonal attraction will be. Other researchers have converged on 
similar notions.  
Conforming to the values and interests of another person has been associated 
with greater mutual attraction (Jones, 1964; Newcomb, 1961). Jones (1964) cites a 
study (Gerard & Greenbaum, 1962) where ambiguous stimuli are presented to a 
participant and three confederates. The first two confederates always disagreed with 
the participant, while the fourth confederate either agreed or disagreed at varying 
points in the experiment. Interestingly, the participant rated the fourth confederate as 
particularly attractive (i.e., degree of desire to have a future association with the 
fourth confederate) when the confederate initially disagreed but then later in the 
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procedure switched to agreeing with the participant. In effect, the confederate’s 
conformity to the opinion of the participant resulted in greater liking.  
Research on the chameleon effect (non-conscious mimicry of an interaction 
partner) shows that mimicking increases liking of the imitator (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005) and increases perception of an interaction as smooth and harmonious 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Imitators are more persuasive than non-imitators 
(Bailenson & Yee, 2005), and are rewarded for their imitation. For example, a 
waitress who verbally repeats an order to customers receives larger tips than if she 
merely paraphrases the order (van Baaren, Holland, Steenaert, & van Knippenberg, 
2003). Despite the wealth of research concerning the positive relationship between 
similarity (both attitudinal and behavioral) and favorable impressions, the issue of 
whether there are limits on this relationship is not clear. 
While past similarity research examined the effect of perceived similarity in 
interpersonal dyadic relationships, other researchers have suggested that individuals 
desire an optimal level of similarity-differentiation from multiple others (Brewer, 
1991; Jarymowicz, 1998; Lemaine, 1974; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Ziller, 1964). 
Too much or too little similarity is associated with negative emotions and a desire to 
obtain an optimal level of similarity-differentiation (Fromkin, 1970, 1972; Snyder & 
Fromkin, 1980). While Byrne (1971) focused on the number of characteristics that an 
individual shares with another individual, Snyder and Fromkin focused on the number 
of individuals who are similar to a target person. Both paradigms lack data 
concerning the attribution that the similar other is or is not intentionally imitating the 
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individual. While discussing the practice of conforming to the opinions of others as a 
means of ingratiation, Jones (1964; 1990) notes that the ingratiating behavior must be 
perceived as authentic. If an attribution of authenticity is not achieved, the 
ingratiating attempt will backfire (Brown, 1998; Jones, 1964, 1990).  
With respect to identity theft, a small amount of similarity—when one self-
characteristic is copied—can be experienced as positive (i.e., flattering) while too 
much similarity—two or more characteristics—results in negative reactions (Reysen 
et al., 2009). The element that is lacking in previous research concerning similarity is 
the attribution that the copier intended to copy the participant. Perceived intention on 
the part of the imitator also distinguishes identity theft from research on the 
motivation for uniqueness (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), which shows, for example, that 
people experience negative emotions when they perceive themselves to be similar to 
many others (Fromkin, 1972). In this research, participants are informed that there are 
a large number of others who are very similar to them, implying that they are not as 
unique as they might have thought (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). In the case of identity 
theft, an active intention on the part of the identity thief to appropriate characteristics 
of one's public identity is inferred. Likewise, the extensive program of research 
demonstrating that increasing the number of shared attitudes with another increases 
interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971) assumes this sharing is not the result of one 
person appropriating the beliefs of the other.  
As shown by Reysen and colleagues (2009), identity theft is not a threat to 
uniqueness. In their Experiment 1, when a greater number of characteristics were 
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copied, participants’ ratings of uniqueness did not differ across conditions. In 
Experiment 2, the intention of the similar other person was manipulated. Participants 
reported feeling significantly less unique when the similar other was a new student 
(no intention to copy) compared to when the similar other was perceived as 
intentionally copying the participant. Thus, identity theft is conceptually distinct from 
past research concerning similarity and mimicry. However, if identity theft does not 
threaten participants’ uniqueness, the question of why identity theft is threatening 
remains. The answer may be found in the emotional response that occurs in identity 
theft situations.  
Anger 
Anger is a likely response when one’s self or identity is threatened because 
one is treated in a way that does not reflect the manner one wishes to be treated 
(Leary, 2004). The anger felt when one’s self is threatened can lead to confrontation 
with the blameworthy other who is the cause of the threat (Bushman & Baumeister, 
1998). Indeed, Reysen et al. (2009) found that anger was increased, as was the desire 
to confront the copier, when faced with identity theft. Appraisal theories of emotions 
suggest that distinct patterns of how individuals interpret an event predict specific 
emotions and actions (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, 
Clore, & Collins, 1988; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; Scherer, 1999; Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993).  
In the most prominent appraisal theory of emotion, Lazarus (1991) proposed 
that there are three types of primary appraisals: goal relevance, goal congruency, and 
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ego-involvement. Goal relevance is the extent to which an event affects a person’s 
goals. Goal congruency, or incongruency, is whether the event facilitates or hinders a 
person’s goals. Ego-involvement consists of goals that individuals hold (e.g., moral 
values) that reflect commitments to a certain role in life. Lazarus also claimed there 
are three types of secondary appraisals: blame or credit, coping potential, and future 
expectations. Blame or credit refers to responsibility for the event. Coping potential 
captures whether the person has the capacity to manage the demands of the event. 
Future expectations refer to whether the outcome of an event can be changed. 
Emotions are differentiated in terms of their specific primary and secondary 
appraisals.  
Lazarus (1991) theorized that the primary appraisals of events that lead to 
anger include (1) the event is relevant to the self, (2) the event is incongruent with the 
individual’s goals, and (3) there is a threat to the individual’s identity. An additional 
secondary appraisal concerns whether another person is to blame for the intentional 
and harmful actions. If individuals cope by perceiving that an attack on the 
blameworthy other is (1) viable and (2) will lead to a positive outcome then anger is 
facilitated.  
Many other researchers have converged on similar antecedent appraisals that 
are associated with feelings of anger, such as goal incongruence (Ellsworth, 1994; 
Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Fischer, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, 
Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Conner, 1987; 
Ortony et al., 1988; Wierzbicka, 1992), threat to one’s ego (Baumeister, Smart, & 
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Boden, 1996; Fehr, Baldwin, Collins, Patterson, & Benditt, 1999; Izard, 1977; 
Kemper, 1987; Kernis, Grannemann, & Barclay, 1989; Kliewer, 1986), assignment of 
blame to another person (Bennett, Lowe, & Honey, 2003; Clore & Ortony, 1991; 
Clore, Ortony, Dienes, & Fujita, 1993; Hazebroek, Howells, & Day, 2001), and a 
belief that one can cope with the threat (Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1990). 
However, the above antecedents do not necessarily imply that feeling anger is 
connected to moral judgments.  
Moral Anger 
Research and theorizing about morality typically excludes discussion of anger 
(Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). However, participants are often found to 
express anger when their moral beliefs are threatened (Skitka, 2002; Tetlock, Kristel, 
Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). For example, Mullen and Skitka (2006) presented 
participants with either a morally congruent or incongruent court judgment and found 
participants reported more anger when the court’s judgment was incongruent with the 
participant’s moral beliefs. Mikula, Scherer, and Athenstaedt (1998) asked 2,921 
students in 37 countries to describe situations in which they experience anger. The 
anger eliciting events were found to overwhelming describe perceived unjust and 
immoral events. Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) theorized that anger is 
associated with individual freedom and rights. The act of identity theft can reasonably 
be described as violating a victim’s right to the freedom to present to the world a 
unique identity. To violate this right should be viewed by the victim as unjust and 
evoke moral anger.  
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The concept of justice is typically defined as a feeling of deservingness based 
on who one believes one is (Buchanan & Mathieu, 1986; Lerner, 1977, 1987). In 
other words, if individuals believe they have a right to display a unique identity then 
the violation of this belief is unjust. Another person who deliberately copies aspects 
of one’s public identity is then responsible for an injustice. Indeed, the attribution that 
a blameworthy other has intentionally acted in a way that brought about harm implies 
the other person is responsible for the action (Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Heider, 
1958; Weiner, 1995). Mikula (2003) describes this perception as the “attribution-of-
blame model of judgments of injust” (p. 795). Mikula suggests that blaming another 
person who is responsible for violating a feeling of entitlement or deservingness 
without reasonable justification will result in moral anger.  
The emotion of anger typically entails antecedents (e.g., intention, blame) that 
can be described as components of moral anger (Power & Dalgleish, 1997). For 
example, emotion theorists have suggested that perceptions of unfairness (Ellsworth 
& Smith, 1988; Frijda et al., 1989; Mikula et al., 1998; Miller, 2001; Wallbott & 
Scherer, 1986) and illegitimacy (Averill, 1982; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Roseman et 
al., 1990; Shaver et al., 1987; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) are 
important for the elicitation of anger. Additionally, if another person is viewed as 
intentionally trying to harm oneself the resulting emotion is anger (Averill, 1982; 
Dodge, 1993; Orobio de Castro, Veerman, Koops, Bosch, & Monshouwer, 2002). 
The violation of an expectation (Shaver et al., 1987) or the disconfirmation of the 
expectation that the world is organized in a certain way (Ellis & Tafrate, 1997) has 
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also been proposed as antecedents to anger. The above anger antecedents suggest that 
illegitimacy, intention to harm, and violation of one’s worldview are important for 
inducing anger. I propose that moral violations, injustice, and anger are closely tied 
constructs. Identity theft may be one such situation where moral anger rather than 
non-moral anger is elicited.  
Rationale for Present Research 
 Individuals seek to engender and maintain a unique public identity that others 
recognize (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959, Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; 
Schlenker, 1980). Identity theft is expected to threaten individuals desire to display a 
unique public identity. This threat should result in anger and a desire to restore one’s 
identity through confrontation with the copier (Reysen et al., 2009). The underlying 
mechanism of identity theft is yet unknown.  
Given that identity theft is thought to threaten the views others have of 
oneself, indeed the very definition of public identity, others may view the victim as 
weak or a pushover. If another person is intentionally copying one’s identity and 
others notice the theft they may mistake the thief as the originator of the identity. The 
victim of the theft may not receive the feedback they desire from their identity since 
others may perceive them as copying the thief. Impression management is behavior 
meant to control one’s public identity. If valued others (e.g., friends) are not afforded 
the opportunity to view the copiers’ actions, then participants may not feel that their 
unique identity is threatened. If the copier freely admits to having copied one’s 
identity, then the credit for that identity remains in control of the victim and this may 
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undermine the consequences of identity theft (e.g., anger). If there were many copiers 
this would make the victim’s management of their identity conceivably more difficult 
because confronting each copier to restore the identity would be rather difficult. The 
underlying mechanism of identity theft may be due to others noticing the theft, the 
loss of credit for one’s identity, the loss of control over one’s identity, or simply that 
one’s moral beliefs have been violated. The present paper reports studies designed to 
examine these possibilities.  
Overview of Empirical Studies 
The present research includes two studies that attempt to understand the 
underlying processes of identity theft. First, this research replicates previous research 
with the addition of dependent measures aimed at assessing moral aspects of the theft 
(e.g., illegitimacy, intention to harm). Past research (Reysen et al., 2009) found that 
the theft of an increasing number of self-characteristics resulted in greater self-reports 
of anger by participants. Furthermore, the relationship between the increase in the 
number of characteristics copied and the anger felt by participants was mediated by 
the perceived intention of the copier. Although the antecedent of intention illuminated 
the possibility of a moral violation, the research lacked the needed measures of moral 
antecedents to support the notion that identity theft is a moral violation. Since anger 
has been linked to reactions to moral violations, the anger felt by victims of identity 
theft may represent moral anger. I hypothesize that moral appraisals of identity theft 
(i.e., illegitimacy, perception of an intention to harm) will mediate the relationship 
between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and expressed anger.  
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Second, this research examines possible reasons why identity theft is 
particularly threatening to participants. Two explanations that are tested in the present 
paper include the victims’ belief that valued others (e.g., friends) will think less of 
them, and the possible loss of credit for the valued self-characteristics. First, identity 
theft may be threatening due to the fact that valued others are able to view the theft. 
If, for example, the identity thief leaves the country and therefore does not stay in the 
local environment of the victim, then victims may experience less threat and anger. 
As previously stated, individuals strive to display a unique public identity (Becker, 
1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959) and seek validation of that identity (Schlenker, 
1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999). If the thief is not in the local environment, and 
valued others are not able to view the theft, then the individual’s identity remains 
unique and others’ validation should not be tainted. Second, a simpler explanation of 
the threat of identity theft is that victims are losing their credentials or originator 
rights to their own identity. Previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) has shown that 
following identity theft validation of one’s identity from a friend can attenuate anger 
and restore credit of the identity back to the victim. If the thief acknowledges the 
theft, this should also attenuate participants’ anger by returning the credit for the 
identity back to the victim. I hypothesize that both public display of the theft and the 
loss of credit for one’s identity increase the level of anger expressed by participants. 
Either of these explanations for the threat caused by identity theft may reasonably 
account for participants’ emotional responses.  
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Third, this research attempts to change participants’ experience of identity 
theft from negative to positive. Inherent in the definition of impression management 
is the desire to control how others view the self (Leary, 1995). In Experiment 2 the 
number of copiers is experimentally manipulated varied. If the number of copiers 
increases to the extent that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to confront each 
copier then participants may feel less anger. The loss of control over the situation 
may induce participants to feel less efficacious to restore their identity. Indeed, the 
notion that feeling that one is not efficacious in a particular situation is associated 
with less anger (Lazarus, 1991; Frijda, 1986; Roseman et al., 1990). Another 
explanation for why victims might feel less anger is that they perceive the situation as 
positive since having many people copy them could result in seeing themselves as 
trendsetters or leaders. If we accept the definition of a leader as someone who has 
followers (Perrin-Jassy, 2001) then simply having a large number of copycats could 
reframe the theft as a leader and follower relationship. I hypothesize that the increase 
in the number of copiers will result in less expressed anger by participants.  
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1 participants read about another person copying varying 
numbers of self-characteristics (one, two, or three characteristics), and the copier 
either moves out of the country or there was no mention of the copier’s residence. 
Participants then rate their emotional experience, perception of the copier, 
interpretation of the event, self-appraisals, and likely behavioral actions. The increase 
in the number of characteristics copied is a replication of the manipulation used by 
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Reysen and colleagues (2009, Experiment 1). The results of the previous experiment 
showed that participants felt more angry and anxious, and less positive, as more 
characteristics were copied. No change in felt uniqueness was observed. Participants 
rated the copier as more hypocritical, less likeable, and less honest as more 
characteristics were copied. As more characteristics were copied, participants 
perceived that the imitation reflected negatively on them, was a theft of their identity, 
and was intentional. Lastly, past research has shown that participants endorsed the 
actions of confrontation, avoidance of the copier, changing their own appearance to a 
greater extent, and less of a desire to befriend the copier as the number of 
characteristics copied increased. Similar results are expected in the present study 
when the number of characteristics copied is varied. In addition to the dependent 
measures previously administered, the present experiments assessed new constructs 
(e.g., illegitimacy, intention to cause harm).  
I hypothesize that identity theft is a violation of participants’ moral beliefs 
regarding ownership of self-characteristics. If this is indeed the case then I expect to 
observe participants reporting more perceived illegitimacy, believing that the copier 
is obligated to acknowledge the copying, experience disrespect, and perceiving the 
copier as intentionally trying to harm them. Additionally, following past appraisal 
theories of emotion research, participants should report greater efficacy to affect the 
situation and perceive less respect from the copier when more than one self-
characteristic is copied. I expect that moral appraisals of the event (e.g., illegitimacy, 
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intention to harm) will mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of 
characteristics copied and the experience of anger. 
One possible underlying mechanism for the threat that identity theft poses to 
participants is that valued others may notice the imitation. This explanation is 
empirically tested in the Experiment 1. In Experiment 1 a manipulation regarding the 
residence of the copier was administered to participants. Participants were either told 
that the copier is moving out of the country or no mention was made regarding the 
copier’s future residence. This manipulation is meant to test the hypothesis that the 
underlying threat of identity theft is that valued others (e.g., friends) will change their 
impression of the victim if they view the copying. Given the agreement that one’s 
public identity reflects how others view oneself (Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 
1959, Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980), victims may be concerned about 
identity theft affecting how others view them. The copier’s future out-of-the-country 
residence should attenuate the anger felt by participants since valued others will not 
be witness to the imitation. An interaction is hypothesized whereby as the number of 
characteristics copied increases participants’ anger will also increase but to a lesser 
extent when the copier moves out of the country. In effect, participants’ anger will 
increase in conjunction with the increasing number of characteristics copied in both 
residence conditions, however anger will be attenuated when the copycat leaves 
compared to when no mention of the copycat’s residence is made.  
Two underlying mechanisms will be examined as mediators between the 
relationship of an increase in the number of characteristics copied and expression of 
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anger. First, the underlying mechanism of valued others noticing the copying is 
expected to mediate the relationship between the number of characteristics stolen and 
anger if indeed participants are concerned about their public reputation and the 
negative impact of others witnessing the theft. Second, the underlying mechanism of 
the loss of credit for the identity is expected to mediate the relationship between the 
number of characteristics copied and anger if indeed the credit as an originator of 
one’s identity is the main concern for participants. Each of these mechanisms are 
examined in Experiment 1.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants (N = 162, 53.1% women) received partial course credit toward 
their introductory psychology requirement. Their mean age was 19.45 years (SD = 
2.72), and 85.2% indicated their racial/ethnic group was white. Participants signed an 
informed consent form, completed a survey packet, and were then debriefed and 
thanked. The survey package began by asking participants to imagine that someone 
was copying aspects of their self-characteristics. The vignettes differed by the number 
of the participants’ aspects that were copied (one, two, or three characteristics) and if 
the copier was going to move out of the country or not (move away, or no mention of 
future residence). Thus, the design of the study was a 2 (residence of copier) X 3 
(number of characteristics copied) between-subjects design. Participants completed 
the dependent measures in the order described below using 7-point Likert-type scales, 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix A).  
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Experimental Manipulations 
Three vignettes were constructed to depict an increasing number of 
characteristics being copied. Participants were asked to imagine that they were 
“hanging out” with friends and met an individual (“Person-A”) of the same gender as 
themselves. Participants were then asked to imagine that Person-A comments that 
s/he likes the participant’s shirt. The vignette then describes how Person-A is seen at 
a later point on campus with the very same shirt s/he had admired (one characteristic). 
In the two-characteristic condition, Person-A had adopted, in addition to the shirt, a 
similar hairstyle as the participants. In the three-characteristic condition, Person-A 
copied the participant’s clothing and hairstyle as in the prior version, and now also 
adopted the mannerisms and personality style of the participants. We chose these 
three characteristics of identity because they have been previously suggested to 
represent characteristics that are interpersonally distinctive: clothing (Buss, 2001; 
James, 1890; Leary, 1995), hairstyle (Buss, 2001; Simon, 2004), and personality and 
mannerisms (Buss, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987; Turner 
& Onorato, 1998).  
A second manipulation was constructed that either informed participants that 
the copier was moving to a foreign country permanently or no mention of the copier’s 
residence was made. The absence of the move condition assumes that participants 
expect the copier to remain in their local environment. The vignettes used are 
presented in Appendix A.  
Dependent Measures 
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Participants first rated the extent to which they felt nine emotions in reaction 
to the theft of their identity. Responses were combined into composite scales 
following a principle components analysis using an orthogonal rotation. The 
eigenvalues and scree plot suggested a three-component scale was appropriate. The 
first component, entitled “Positive Emotions,” accounted for 43.65% of the variance. 
Terms included in the positive emotions index were: pleased, happy, honored, and 
flattered (α = .86). The second component, entitled “Anger,” accounted for 17.27% of 
the variance. Terms in the anger index were: angry, mad, and disrespected (α = .83). 
The third component, entitled “Anxiety,” accounted for 13.89% of the variance. 
Terms for the anxiety index were: worried and afraid (α = .78). See Table 1 for 
component loadings for each item. Additionally, we administered two uniqueness 
items that were not included in the principle components analysis because they are 
not emotion terms. The two items, special and unique, were combined into a 
composite personal uniqueness score (α = .72). See Appendix A for the items 
employed.  
Participants next completed measures assessing perceptions of the copier in 
terms of perceived likeability (Reysen, 2005), honesty (Reysen, 2008), and hypocrisy. 
Four items, “hypocrite,” “impostor,” and “fake” were combined to form the hypocrisy 
measure (α = .79). Additionally, both the likeability (9 items, α = .90) and honesty (8 
items, α = .85) measures were found to be reliable. See Appendix A for the items. 
 Participants then completed items regarding their interpretation of the event. 




Component Loadings for Emotion Items in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Emotion  Component 1  Component 2  Component 3 
 
 
Pleased  .818   -.060   -.098 
 
Happy   .809   -.140   -.216 
 
Honored  .809   -.184   -.032 
 
Flattered  .812   -.198   -.193 
 
Angry   -.207   .884   -.011 
   
Disrespected  -.059   .755   .238 
 
Mad   -.210   .869   .131 
 
Worried  -.187   .233   .836 
 
Afraid   -.156   .061   .905 
 
Eigenvalues  3.93   1.55   1.25 
 
 
Note: Orthogonal rotation. 
 
the extent to which they believed the copying reflected negatively on their image (α = 
.86). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] stealing my identity”) were combined to 
measure the extent to which participants interpreted the situation as a theft of their 
identity (α = .88). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] intending to copy me”) were 
combined to measure participants’ attribution of the copier’s intention to copy them 
(α = .87). Two items (e.g., “[Person-A is] trying to cause me harm”) were combined 
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to measure participants’ attribution that the copying was meant to harm them (α = 
.88). Five items (e.g., “The situation is unjust”) were combined to measure 
participants’ view that the copying was illegitimate (α = .83). Two items (e.g., 
“Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image”) were combined to measure 
participants’ belief that the copier is obligated to credit the participant for the copied 
characteristics (α = .92). Three items (e.g., “Other people might think that I am 
copying Person-A”) were combined to measure participants’ belief that they may lose 
the credit for their copied characteristics (α = .83). Four items (e.g., “People will 
think less of me if Person-A copies me”) were combined to tap participants’ belief 
that the copying will affect their reputation due to their friends noticing it (α = .86). 
See Appendix A for the items. 
 Next, participants completed a number of items concerning self-appraisals. 
Three items (e.g., “[I feel] uncertain about my own image”) were combined to 
measure the extent that participants felt uncertain about their own identity (α = .82). 
Two items (e.g., [I feel] like a leader”) were combined to measure the extent that 
participants felt like a leader (α = .81). Participants completed two items (e.g., “I feel 
I can change the situation”) to measure the extent that they felt efficacious (α = .69). 
Two items (e.g., “I feel that Person-A respects me”) were combined to measure the 
degree that participants felt respected by the copier (α = .75). See Appendix A for the 
items. 
 Participants then completed measures regarding the behaviors they would 
endorse in response to the copying. Two items (e.g., “I would confront Person-A 
 23 
about copying me”) were combined to measure participants’ desire to confront the 
copier (α = .94). Two items (e.g., I would do all I could to avoid Person-A, and 
convince my friends to do the same”) were combined to measure avoidance of the 
copier (α = .88). Two items (e.g., “I would try to become friends with Person-A”) 
were combined to measure the desire by participants to befriend the copier (α = .90). 
Two items (e.g., “I would change my appearance to be different from Person-A”) 
were combined to measure participants’ desire to change their own appearance (α = 
.93). Lastly, three items asked participants to rate the extent that their shirt, hairstyle, 
and personality are important to their image. See Appendix A for all the items. 
Results 
Correlational Analysis 
 Zero-order correlations were first conducted collapsing across conditions (see 
Appendix B. As expected participants’ anger was negatively correlated with their 
positive emotion ratings. Also as expected, anger was positively correlated with the 
belief that the copying reflected negative on their image, and that the copier is 
illegitimately and intentionally trying to harm the participant. The strongest 
correlation was between the four behavioral actions centered on the desire to tell the 
copier to stop and anger. 
Analysis of variance  
A 2 (residence of thief) X 3 (number of characteristics copied) between-
subjects univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the dependent variable 
indices. 
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 Emotional reactions. A main effect for the number of characteristics was 
found for the positive emotion, anger, and anxiety indices (see Table 2). When three 
characteristics were copied, participants felt significantly less positive emotion and 
greater anger than in either the one or two characteristics conditions. The degree of 
anxiety reported by participants increased significantly by condition. Uniqueness did 
not differ across conditions. No main effects were found for the residence of the 
copier on the emotional reactions of participants (see Table 3).  
An interaction between residence and number of characteristics was found for 
positive emotions (see Table 4). Simple effects analysis revealed that when three 
characteristics were stolen, participants who read about the thief moving away (M = 
3.90, SD = 1.26) were happier than participants who did not read about the residence 
change of the thief (M = 3.14, SD = 1.33), t(51) = 2.15, p = .037, d = -.03. No 
differences were obtained between conditions of residence in the one characteristic, 
t(54) = -1.47, p = .147, d = -.39, and two characteristic, t(51) = -.01, p = .99, d = -.01, 
conditions (see Figure 1). Replicating past results (Reysen et al., 2009), when there 
was no mention of the copier’s future residence participants who read about one 
characteristic being copied rated their positive emotions (M = 4.77, SD = 1.00) 
significantly higher than participants in the two characteristics (M = 4.12, SD = 0.97, 
t(51) = 2.42, p = .019, d = .66) and three characteristics (M = 3.14, SD = 1.33, t(52) = 
5.10, p < .001, d = 1.39) conditions. Additionally, ratings of positive emotions when 
the no mention of the copier’s future residence was mentioned significantly differed 














Figure 1. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for 
ratings of positive emotions. 
 
 
When the copier was reported to be moving away, participants did not differ in 
ratings of positive emotions across the number of characteristics conditions. The one 
characteristic condition did not differ significantly from the two, t(54) = 0.56, p = .58, 
d = .15, and three characteristics, t(53) = 1.22, p = .23, d = .33, conditions. 
Additionally, the two and three characteristics conditions did not significantly differ 
when the copier was reported to be moving, t(51) = 0.54, p = .59, d = .15. No other 
interactions were significant. 
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 Ratings of copier. As the number of characteristics copied increased across the 
three conditions, participants rated the copier as significantly more hypocritical and 
less honest. The copier was also rated as significantly more likeable in the one 
characteristic stolen condition than in the two and three characteristics conditions. No 
other main effects of residence of copier or interactions were significant.  
Interpretation of the event. As the number of characteristics copied increased, 
participants increasingly perceived the copying as a theft of their identity and as 
illegitimate. Participants in the one and two characteristics conditions perceived the 
copying to reflect negatively on their image and the copier as intentionally trying to 
harm them to a lesser extent than participants in the three characteristics condition. 
Participants in the three characteristics condition assigned an obligation for the copier 
to admit the copying and believed that others (e.g., friends) would think less of them 
to a significantly greater extent than participants in the one characteristic condition. 
The perception that the copying was intentional was rated significantly higher in the 
two and three characteristics conditions than the one characteristic condition. 
Participants’ perception that they are losing the credit for their own image did not 
significantly differ across conditions. A main effect of residence of copier was found 
where participants rated the perception that the copier is stealing their identity higher 
compared to participants who read about the copier moving away. No other main 
effects of the residence of the copier or interactions were significant.  
Self-appraisals. Main effects were found for the number of characteristics for 
each of the self-appraisal variables. Participants in the one characteristic condition felt 
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more uncertain about their own identity, more efficacious to change the situation, less 
like a leader, and less respected by the copier than participants in the three 
characteristics condition. No main effects of the residence of the copier were 
significant. An interaction was found for feeling like a leader. Simple effects analysis 
revealed that when there was only one characteristic copied, participants who read 
about the copier moving away (M = 4.43, SD = 1.39) reported feeling marginally 
significantly less like a leader than when no mention was made of the copier’s future 
residence (M = 5.00, SD = 0.92), t(54) = -1.80, p = .075, d = -.48 (see Figure 2). 
Additionally, when three characteristics were copied participants who read about the 
copier moving (M = 4.37, SD = 1.32) rated feeling like a leader marginally 
significantly higher than participants who did not read about the copier moving (M = 
3.56, SD = 1.67), t(51) = 1.95, p = .057, d = .54. There was not a significant 
difference between conditions of the copier’s residence in the two characteristic 
condition, t(51) = -0.71, p = .48, d = -.19. When the copier’s future residence was not 
mentioned the participants in the one characteristic (M = 5.00, SD = 0.92) condition 
rated feeling like a leader significantly higher than participants in the three 
characteristic (M = 3.56, SD = 1.67) condition, t(52) = 3.93, p < .001, d = 1.07. When 
the copier’s future residence was not mentioned the participants in the two 
characteristic (M = 4.67, SD = 1.06) condition rated feeling like a leader significantly 
higher than participants in the three characteristic condition, t(51) = 2.90, p = .006, d 
= .79. When no mention of the residence was made participants did not differ in 
ratings of feeling like a leader between the one and two characteristic conditions, 
 34 
t(51) = 1.20, p = .24, d = .33. When the copier’s future residence was reported 
participants did not differ in ratings of feeling like a leader between the one and two 
characteristic, t(54) = 0.06, p = .95, d = .01, one and three characteristic, t(53) = 0.18, 
p = .86, d = .04, and two and three characteristics, t(51) = 0.10, p = .92, d = .03, 
conditions. No other interactions were significant.  
 
Figure 2. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for 





Behavioral Reactions. Main effects of the number of characteristics were 
found for three of the four behavioral variables administered. As the number of 
characteristics copied increased, participants increasingly endorsed confronting the 
copier. Participants in the three characteristics condition endorsed avoiding the copier 
to a greater extent than in the one and two characteristic conditions. Participants 
endorsed befriending the copier to a lesser extent in the two and three characteristics 
conditions compared to the one characteristic condition. The extent that participants 
expressed a desire to change their own identity did not significantly differ across 
conditions. No main effects for the residence of the copier or interactions were 
significant.  
Importance of characteristics. No main effects for the number of 
characteristics or the residence of the copier were significant for ratings of the 
importance of participants’ shirt, hairstyle, or personality. Interactions were found for 
self-ratings of the importance of the shirt and hairstyle. Simple effects analysis 
revealed that when there was only one characteristic stolen, participants who read 
about the thief moving away (M = 4.52, SD = 1.46) reported less importance of their 
shirt than when no mention was made of the copier’s future residence (M = 5.33, SD 
= 1.44), t(54) = -.2.11, p = .04, d = -.56 (see Figure 3). Participants did not differ in 
their ratings of the importance of their shirt between the conditions of the future 
residence of the copier for either the two characteristics, t(51) = 0.62, p = .54, d = .17, 
or the three characteristics, t(51) = 1.22, p = .23, d = .34, conditions. When the copier 
was reported to be moving there was no significant difference between the one and 
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two, t(54) = -1.48, p = .15, d = -.39, one and three, t(53) = -1.56, p = .12, d = -.42, and 
two and three characteristics, t(51) = 0.09, p = .93, d = .03, conditions. When no 
mention was made of the copier’s future residence there was no significant difference 
between the one and two, t(51) = 1.19, p = .24, d = .32, one and three, t(52) = 1.75, p 
= .087, d = .47, and two and three characteristics, t(51) = 0.57, p = .57, d = .16, 
conditions. When there was only one characteristic copied, participants who read 
about the copier moving away (M = 4.45, SD = 1.55) reported less importance of their 
hairstyle than when no mention was made of the copier’s future residence (M = 5.52, 
SD = 1.48), t(54) = -.2.64, p = .01, d = -.71 (see Figure 4). No significant differences 
between conditions of copier’s residence were found for the two, t(51) = -0.72, p = 
.48, d = .20, and three characteristics, t(51) = 1.36, p = .18, d = .38, conditions. When 
the future residence of the copier was not mentioned participants in the one (M = 
5.52, SD = 1.48) rated the importance of their hairstyle higher than participants in the 
two (M = 4.42, SD = 1.77, t(51) = 2.45, p = .018, d = .67), and three characteristics 
(M = 4.52, SD = 1.76, t(52) = 2.26, p = .028, d = .61) conditions. No difference was 
found when no mention was given of the copier’s future residence between the two  
and three characteristics conditions, t(51) = -0.20, p = .85, d = -.06. When the copier 
was reported to be moving no differences were found between the one and two, t(54) 
= -0.73, p = .47, d = -.19, one and three, t(53) = -1.69, p = .10, d = -.46, and two and 




Figure 3. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for 











Figure 4. Interaction between number of characteristics and residence of copier for 




 Possible mediators of the effect of the increase in the number of 
characteristics stolen on the anger felt by participants were examined. Using the SPSS 
macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) for testing mediation with 
bootstrapping (1,000 iterations), I entered the condition (number of characteristics 
copied: 1 = one characteristic, 2 = two characteristics, 3 = three characteristics) as the 
independent variable, and anger as the dependent variable. I included the previously 
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theorized antecedents of moral anger as the mediators: (a) participants’ perception 
that the copying is illegitimate, (b) attribution that the copier is intentionally copying 
characteristics to harm them, and two variables proposed to influence anger 
experienced after identity theft (c) concern over the loss of the credentials of one’s 
identity, and (d) concern that valued others will notice and think less of the 
participant due to the copying. As shown in Figure 5, number of characteristics 
copied predicted participants’ experience of anger (β = .30, p < .001). Condition also 
predicted the perceived illegitimacy of the copying (β = .50, p < .001), and the 
perception that the copier is purposefully trying to harm the participant (β = .37, p < 
.001). Condition marginally predicted participants’ concern for the credit of their 
identity (β = .15, p = .054). Condition predicted participants’ concern that others will 
think less of them due to the copying (β = .24, p = .002). Illegitimacy predicted anger 
(β = .40, p < .001). Participants’ attribution of the copier’s intention to harm them 
predicted anger (β = .30, p < .001). Participants’ concern regarding a potential loss of 
credentials did not significantly predict anger (β = .12, p = .123). Participants’ 
concern regarding a loss of respect from friends and others who may notice the 
copying did not significantly predict anger (β = -.07, p = .360). When the mediators 
are included, the relationship between condition and anger becomes non-significant 
(β = -.03, p = .614). The total effect of the mediators combined show a full mediation 
of the relationship between condition and anger as indicated by the absence of zero 
between the 95% confidence interval at the p < .05 (two tailed) level (CI = .351 to 






intention of the copier to harm the participant (CI = .119 to .336) were significant 
mediators of the relationship between condition and anger. However, the concern 
over the loss of credentials (CI = -.008 to .103), and negative reflections from valued 
others due to the copying (CI = -.110 to .033) were not significant mediators because 
they contained zero within the confidence intervals.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 was designed to examine the notion that identity theft is a moral 
violation and test the possibility that the underlying reason that identity theft is 
threatening to participants is that others will witness the theft. The results concerning 
the moral appraisals of the theft support the hypothesis that identity theft is a moral 
violation. However, the results do not support the hypothesis that identity theft is 
threatening due to the presence of the copier in the victim’s local environment.  
Number of Characteristics Copied 
 The effects of the increase in the number of characteristics replicated past 
results obtained by Reysen and colleagues (2009). As predicted, when only one 
characteristic of the self was copied, participants felt flattered and liked the thief. 
However, when more than one self-characteristic was stolen participants viewed the 
theft as intentional, felt angry, rated the thief negatively, and endorsed confronting the 
thief. Ratings of the new measures regarding participants’ interpretation of the event 




 Participants reported feeling greater efficacy and disrespect when three 
characteristics were copied compared to one characteristic. Furthermore, participants 
interpreted the theft as illegitimate, and believed the copier intended to harm them 
and was obligated to admit the copying. The mediation analysis lent additional 
support to the notion that the anger experienced can reasonably be described as moral 
anger. The two antecedents (i.e., illegitimacy, attribution of intent to harm) that 
mediated the relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied 
and the anger felt by participants have been previously suggested as moral appraisals. 
Lazarus’ (1991) appraisals of anger (i.e., relevance, incongruent, threat to ego, blame, 
efficacy) did not mediate the relationship between the increase in the number of 
characteristics copied and felt anger when the moral antecedents (i.e., illegitimacy, 
intent to harm) were included in the mediational model. However, past theorists have 
suggested that not all of the antecedent conditions need to be present for every 
individual to feel anger (Frijda & Zeelenberg, 2001; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, 
& De Boeck, 2003; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007; 
Parkinson, 2001; Russell, 2003; Scherer, 2001; Shweder, 1993). In effect, some moral 
appraisals of the event were more important in predicting anger than other moral 
appraisals or non-moral appraisals that have been previously investigated.  
Residence of Copier 
 No significant main effects were found as a function of the future residence of 
the copier. This may be due to a failure to properly manipulate whether or not others 
can view the copying, or that the underlying threat to participants is not dependent on 
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whether others will view the theft. Overall, the results support the notion that 
participants are not threatened by valued others witnessing the theft. The 
manipulation of residence of the thief did not affect ratings of anger. Participants’ 
concern that others will witness the copying did not mediate the relationship between 
the increase in the number of characteristics copied and the experience of anger. 
Together the findings lend support to the view that participants are not concerned 
about valued others’ reactions to the theft. In other words, participants are angered by 
the theft regardless of whether the copier stays in town or leaves the country.  
The manipulation of the residence of the copier did influence four dependent 
variables. Interactions were observed between the residence of the copier and the 
number of characteristics for feeling positive emotion, feeling like a leader, and 
ratings of the importance of the shirt and hairstyle to the participant’s image.  
First, participants who read about three self-characteristics being copied rated 
their positive emotions higher when the copier was reported to be moving rather than 
when no mention was made of the future residence of the copier. Participants may 
have expressed positive emotions because since the need for confrontation was 
obviated when the copier moved out of the country. In effect, participants are still 
angered by the copying but may feel happy that they do not have to confront the 
copier.  
When one characteristic was copied participants reported feeling like a leader 
to a greater extent than when the copier stayed in the local environment. This finding 
was reversed when three characteristics were copied. The interaction resulted in no 
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difference across the number of characteristics when the copier is purported to be 
moving away, yet feeling like a leader drops significantly when a greater number of 
characteristics are copied and no mention of the residence is given. I suggest that 
what is driving this interaction is when no mention of the copier is made participants 
felt less and less like a leader the more characteristics are copied. When only one 
characteristic was copied participants rated their shirt and haircut as more important 
to their image when the copier moved compared to the no mention of the future 
residence condition. The increase in importance of the shirt when the copier remains 
in town may be due to participants feeling like a leader and being proud that another 
person values a self-characteristic of theirs. The increase in the importance of the 
haircut is most likely an artifact because participants were not informed of the theft of 
their hairstyle in the one characteristic condition.  
 Overall, the results of Experiment 1 support the prediction that identity theft is 
a moral violation that results in anger and a desire to confront the copier. However, 
the results do not support the prediction that an underlying mechanism of identity 
theft is that valued others may view the theft. Although the mediation analysis in 
Experiment 1 did not support the notion that the loss of credit for one’s identity 
contributes to the anger felt by participants, credit for one’s identity was more directly 
manipulated in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to assess the possibility that the loss of credit for 
one’s identity is the threat underlying identity theft effects. Second, Experiment 2 was 
 45 
designed to attempt to change the meaning of identity theft by increasing the number 
of copiers. I have suggested that identity theft threatens one’s ability to display a 
distinctive public identity. While the results of Experiment 1 suggest that identity 
theft is not a threat due to the theft being witnessed by valued others, the possibility 
still remains that the identity thief is harming the victim’s ability to display a 
distinctive public identity by stealing the credit for that identity. Past studies (Reysen 
et al., 2009) have shown that if a third-party acknowledges the thief is stealing the 
victim’s identity this attenuates the victim’s anger. Conversely, if a third-party 
accuses the victim of being the thief this accentuates the victim’s anger. When a 
third-party acknowledges the theft the credit for the identity remained in the victim’s 
control. When a third-party invalidates the victim’s identity the credit for the identity 
was given to the identity thief. In both cases the victim’s identity was stolen, however 
losing the credit was more threatening and resulted in greater anger. Thus, the loss of 
credit for one’s identity may be an underlying reason for the threat of identity theft. 
To test this, the credit for the participant’s identity is manipulated in the present 
experiment. I hypothesize that participants will feel less angry when they retain 
control over the credit to their identity.  
A second manipulation was undertaken in an attempt to change the meaning 
of the theft. Inherent in the definition of impression management is the desire to 
control how others view the self (Leary, 1995). The number of thieves was varied in 
attempt to manipulate the amount of control participants feel they have over their 
identity. If one person copies self-characteristics, victims can conceivably confront 
 46 
the copier and regain control over their identity. If however, 64 people copy the 
participant, the action of confrontation to restore one’s distinctive public identity is 
much more difficult. Past emotion theorists have suggested that efficacy is an 
antecedent to feeling angry (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990). If an 
individual believes he or she can deal with the threat, then more anger is predicted. In 
effect, if one person is copying the victim then the victim should feel efficacious and 
therefore feel angry. Indeed, Experiment 1 showed that efficacy was significantly 
positively correlated with anger, and greater efficacy was reported when three 
characteristics, as compared to one characteristic, were stolen. If there are 64 thieves 
this should be perceived by the victim as an uncontrollable event and subsequently 
attenuate felt anger. The manipulation of number of copiers may also change the 
perceived meaning of identity theft. Instead of feeling threatened by the theft in this 
case, participants may reevaluate the situation as positive and feel that they are 
leaders of a trend. Consequently, participants should express less anger because: (1) 
they should feel less efficacious, and (2) they may feel like a leader.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Participants (N = 192, 53.6% men) received partial course credit toward their 
introductory psychology requirement. Their mean age was 18.97 years (SD = 1.13), 
and 84.4% indicated their racial/ethnic group was white. Identical to Experiment 1, 
participants signed an informed consent, read a vignette containing the experimental 
manipulations, rated the same dependent measures (e.g., emotional reactions, 
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interpretations of the event) as those presented in Experiment 1, and were debriefed 
and thanked. The design of the present experiment was a 4 (number of copiers) X 2 
(acknowledgement of the copying by the copier) between-subjects design. 
Experimental Manipulations 
 All participants read about a person who has copied three characteristics of 
another person’s identity (i.e., shirt, hair, and personality). To manipulate the number 
of copiers participants were asked to imagine that 1, 16, 32, or 64 people purportedly 
copied three characteristics from the participant. A second manipulation informed 
participants that when asked, the copier, or copiers, admitted that they had copied 
those attributes of the participant or no mention was given of the acknowledgement. 
In effect, the no acknowledgement condition assumes that participants do not expect 
that the thief is acknowledging the copying. See Appendix C for the vignettes.  
Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures were identical to those administered in Experiment 1 
(see Appendix A). The emotion items were combined into composite scales following 
a principle components analysis using an orthogonal rotation. The eigenvalues and 
scree plot again suggested a three-component scale was appropriate. The first 
component, entitled “Positive Emotions,” accounted for 48.00% of the variance (4 
items, α = .90). The second component, entitled “Anger,” accounted for 17.02% of 
the variance (3 items, α = .80). The third component, entitled “Anxiety,” accounted 
for 12.19% of the variance (2 items, α = .81). See Table 5 for the component loadings 




Component Loadings for Emotion Items in Experiment 2. 
 
 
Emotion  Component 1  Component 2  Component 3 
 
 
Pleased  .786   -.212   -.060 
 
Happy   .812   -.388   -.078 
 
Honored  .893   -.183   -.092 
 
Flattered  .862   -.153   -.132 
 
Angry   -.237   .879   .024 
   
Disrespected  -.259   .613   .275 
 
Mad   -.215   .871   .168 
 
Worried  -.064   .168   .893 
 
Afraid   -.130   .122   .897 
 
Eigenvalues  4.32   1.53   1.10 
 
 
Note: Orthogonal rotation. 
 
Other measures included: uniqueness (2 items, α = .73), hypocritical (3 items, α = 
.58), likeable (9 items, α = .87), honest (8 items, α = .83), negative image (4 items, α 
= .84), stealing identity (2 items, α = .85), intent to copy (2 items, α = .75), 
illegitimacy (5 items, α = .78), intent to harm (2 items, α = .86), obligation to 
acknowledge (2 items, α = .90), credit (3 items, α = .80), notice (4 items, α = .85), 
uncertain (3 items, α = .79), leader (2 items, α = .81), efficacy (2 items, α = .62), 
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respect (2 items, α = .70), confront (α = .86), avoid (2 items, α = .85), befriend (2 
items, α = .88), and change (2 items, α = .94). Lastly, three items asked participants 




Zero-order correlations were calculated collapsing across conditions (see 
Appendix D). Identical to Experiment 1, participants’ anger was negatively correlated 
with positive emotions, anger was positively correlated with the belief that the 
copying reflected negative on their image, and that the copier is illegitimately and 
intentionally trying to harm the participant. The strongest correlation between the four 
behavioral actions and anger was the desire to tell the copier to stop. 
Analysis of Variance 
A 4 (number of copiers) X 2 (acknowledgement of copying) between-subjects 
univariate ANOVA was conducted on each of the dependent variable indices. No 
significant main effects were found for the number of copiers (see Table 6). Further, 
no interactions between the number of copiers and acknowledgement by the copiers 
were significant (see Table 7). Significant main effects for whether or not the 
copier(s) acknowledged copying the participant’s self-characteristics were obtained 
(see Table 8). Participants reported greater positive emotion, uniqueness, ratings of 
the copier(s) as honest, and a desire to befriend the copier(s) when the copier(s) 














copying. Participants reported less anger, perceived less intention to harm, and less 
desire to avoid the copier(s) when they read about the copier(s) acknowledging the 
copying compared to participants who did not read about an acknowledgement by the 
copier(s).  
Mediational Analysis 
Potential mediators of the effect of the acknowledgement by the copier(s) on 
participants’ anger was examined. Using the SPSS macro provided by Preacher and 
Hayes (2004, 2008) for testing mediation with bootstrapping (1,000 iterations), I 
entered the condition (acknowledgement: 0 = no mention of acknowledgement, 1 = 
copier(s) acknowledge the theft) as the independent variable, and anger as the 
dependent variable. I included the attribution that the copier is intentionally copying 
characteristics to harm the participant, and the perceived honesty of the copier(s) as 
mediators. These mediators were chosen because intention to harm was found to be 
important for predicting anger in Experiment 1, and honesty should be closely related 
to viewing another person as not attempting to harm the participant. As shown in 
Figure 6, condition (0 = no mention, 1 = acknowledge theft) predicted participants’ 
experience of anger (β = -.15, p = .033). Condition marginally significantly predicted 
the perception that the copier is purposefully trying to harm the participant (β = -.14, 
p = .055). Condition predicted participants’ perception of the honesty of the copier(s) 
(β = .21, p = .004). Participants’ attribution of the copiers’ intention to harm them 
predicted anger (β = .35, p < .001). Participants’ ratings of perceived honesty of the 




equation, the relationship between condition and anger becomes non-significant (β = -
.03, p = .601). The total effect of the mediators combined indicated mediation of the 
relationship between condition and anger as indicated by the absence of zero between 
the 95% confidence interval at the p < .05 (two tailed) level (CI = -.615 to -.114). The 
perceived intention of the copier to harm the participant (CI = -.341 to -.006) and the 
perceived honesty of the copier(s) (CI = -.413 to -.073) were significant mediators of 
the relationship between the condition and anger.  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 was conducted to assess the viability of loss of credit for one’s 
identity as a possible explanation for the threat posed by identity theft, and to 
examine whether the meaning of identity theft can be manipulated by increasing the 
number of copiers. The hypothesis that an individual’s loss of credit for an identity is 
the underlying threat posed by identity theft was only partially supported. 
Acknowledgement by the copier(s) did attenuate the anger expressed by participants. 
The number of copiers, however, had no effect on participants’ reactions to the 
identity theft. Participants felt angry regardless of how many followers copied them. 
Thus, the second hypothesis was not supported. 
When the copier(s) acknowledged the theft, participants felt happier and less 
angry compared to when the credit for the identity was not acknowledged. 
Furthermore, participants rated the copier(s) as honest and would befriend them to a 
greater extent when there was an acknowledgement of copying compared to when 
none was given. The findings suggest that honesty was rewarded, but only to a certain 
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extent. The acknowledgement may have validated the participants’ identity and 
provided them with a boost in feelings of uniqueness. The reduction in anger was 
driven by the participant’s view that the copier(s) was not intentionally trying to harm 
them and the perception that the copier(s) was honest. However, regardless of 
acknowledgement, participants still believed that the theft was illegitimate, damaged 
their image, and they endorsed confrontation. The manipulation of acknowledgement 
appears to have simply changed the perceived honesty and the copier’s intention to do 
harm, which affected felt anger. Yet, regardless of whether an acknowledgement of 
the copying is made or not the moral violation has still occurred and participants 
continue to believe that the incident is unjust.  
Overall, Experiment 2 reinforces the idea that identity theft leads to anger due 
to a moral violation rather than concern for the loss of credit for an identity. The 
number of copiers had no effect on the anger felt by participants. The 
acknowledgement by the copiers aided in attenuating the anger, however the moral 
violation is evident in participants’ responses (e.g., illegitimate). When the credit of 
the identity is returned to the victim, anger is attenuated, although the act of copying 
is still viewed as illegitimate and harmful to the person’s public identity. In effect, 
identity theft is still threatening even when credit for the identity is retained.  
General Discussion 
The present research attempted to illuminate the underlying processes that 
occur when people perceive themselves to be victims of identity theft. Possible 
reasons for the threat that identity theft poses include (1) the belief that valued others 
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may view the theft, (2) a violation of moral belief, and (3) loss of credit for the 
identity. Additionally, I attempted to manipulate the perceived meaning of identity 
theft for victims. The hypotheses that valued others not witnessing the theft and an 
increase in the number of copiers would attenuate the anger felt by participants were 
not supported. The hypothesis that the loss of credit was an underlying mechanism of 
identity theft was only partially supported. Anger was attenuated when the victims of 
identity theft retained the credit to their identity, however the perceived honesty of the 
thief and the perception that the thief did not intend to harm the participant were the 
important variables predicting the reduction in anger. The potential underlying basis 
of the threat tested in the current studies adds to our knowledge of what identity theft 
is and is not. Identity theft is not threatening because of concerns regarding valued 
others noticing the theft, and it is not threatening because the credit for the identity is 
taken away. Rather, the results suggest that identity theft is threatening because a 
moral violation is perceived to have occurred. In effect, identity theft represents an 
insult to one’s belief that one has a right to present a unique public identity that 
should not be copied. This insult is viewed by participants as unjust and intentionally 
harm-provoking.  
Moral Violation 
 Past research has shown that anger is the primary response to moral violations 
(Mikula et al., 1998; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka, 2002; Tetlock et al., 2000). 
Supporting appraisal theorists, the moral antecedents of illegitimacy (Averill, 1982; 
Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Roseman et al., 1990; Shaver et al., 1987; Skarlicki & 
 61 
Folger, 1997; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) and an attribution of intent to harm (Averill, 
1982; Dodge, 1993; Orobio de Castro et al., 2002) were found to mediate the 
relationship between an increase in the number of characteristics copied and greater 
felt anger. I suggest that identity theft violates the belief that one has a right to the 
freedom to present a unique identity to the world. As shown in Experiment 1 
participants were more likely to state that the thief should acknowledge that they are 
copying the participant when three compared to one characteristic was copied. In a 
manner, participants are stating that a social norm has been violated whereby another 
person has wronged them and the copier should admit that they have committed the 
action. Although there was not an explicit measure of moral belief regarding copying, 
the obligation measure (e.g., Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image) 
provides support for the notion that an expectation has been violated. When a thief 
copies multiple self-characteristics participants are angered by the unexpected 
(Shaver et al., 1987) disconfirmation of their worldview (Ellis & Tafrate, 1997). The 
difference between a non-moral and moral violation requires further research, 
however the results thus far support the notion that identity theft is perceived as a 
moral violation.  
Underlying Threat of Identity Theft 
 The proposed underlying bases of threat stemming from identity theft (i.e., 
witnesses viewing the theft and the loss of credit for one’s identity) were not 
supported as explanations for the threat that identity theft poses. The mediation 
analysis in Experiment 1 showed that these two variables did not contribute to the 
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anger felt by participants. The manipulation of the future residence of the thief also 
did not affect the anger felt by participants, indicating that participants were upset 
regardless of whether friends might view the theft or not. In Experiment 2 participants 
either retained credit for the identity or not, and while anger was attenuated when 
credit was retained the reduction was most likely driven by the fact that participants 
did not view the copier(s) behavior as intentionally harm-provoking. Participants still 
believed the copying was illegitimate, that it constituted intentional identity theft, and 
the copier(s) should admit that they copied the participant. Additionally, 
confrontation was the highest rated of the likely actions to take against the copier(s). 
In other words, although participants were less angry when the copier(s) admitted to 
the theft, participants still viewed the identity theft as a moral violation.  
Manipulating the Meaning of Identity Theft 
In Experiment 2, the meaning of identity theft was predicted to be viewed as 
positive when multiple people copied the participants because the participants could 
view themselves as leaders and the situation would be more difficult to change. 
Emotion theorists have suggested that efficacy is an antecedent to feeling angry 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Roseman et al., 1990). If an individual feels able to deal 
with the threat, then more anger is predicted. These hypotheses were not supported. 
The theft was seen as a moral violation regardless of the number of copiers. In fact, 
the manipulation of number of copiers had no effect on any of the dependent 
measures. The hypothesis that participants may feel more like a leader or less 
efficacious when there were many copiers was also not supported.  
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Implications for Past Identity Theft Research 
 The results of the present studies add to existing knowledge of identity theft. 
In previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) the authors examined the conditions under 
which identity theft is threatening and might elicit negative emotions and 
confrontational intentions. The results showed that for situations to be experienced as 
identity theft multiple characteristics must be stolen, participants must perceive that 
the thief is intentionally stealing their identity, and that the theft concerns their own 
personal identity characteristics. Furthermore, third-party validation and priming 
internal unchanging characteristics attenuated participant anger, while third-party 
invalidation accentuated participant anger. The aim of the present experiments was to 
gain a deeper understanding of why identity theft is particularly threatening to 
participants. In Experiment 1, the increase in the number of characteristics copied 
replicated past findings. This result supports the reliability of the effect of identity 
theft on participant emotions, interpretations, and behavioral endorsements. However, 
Experiment 1 added to our understanding of the moral implications of identity theft. 
Additional measures that were meant to tap moral appraisals of the event (e.g., 
illegitimacy, intention to harm) were administered and found to affect the anger 
experienced by participants. This finding lends support to the notion that victims of 
identity theft believe that the theft is illegitimate and immoral. 
 Given that past studies have shown that third parties can both attenuate and 
accentuate the anger experienced by participants, I reasoned that a possible cause of 
the threat posed by identity theft is that valued others may witness the theft. Others 
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may think less favorably of the victim or misattribute the originator of the identity to 
the thief. Both explanations suggest that the threat of identity theft affects the victim’s 
public identity. Indeed, in past research as well as Experiment 1, as more 
characteristics are copied, participants report that the theft harms their image to a 
greater extent. The manipulation of whether or not others could view the theft had no 
effect on the dependent variables. This may be due to a problem with how 
participants interpreted the manipulation. The manipulation states, “You later learn 
that Person-A is moving next week to a foreign country and will not be moving 
back.” Participants may have interpreted this to mean that they learned of the 
information through a friend, or that others may witness the theft before the copier 
moves out of the country. In both instances, others may be thought to have a chance 
to witness the theft. If that is the case, it may have undermined the purpose of the 
manipulation. If, however, the manipulation was correctly interpreted by participants, 
the results suggest that others witnessing the theft is less important than the fact that a 
moral violation has occurred. Participants may be more concerned that someone is 
wronging them than that other people will see the violation. A second possible reason 
for the threat that identity theft poses is the loss of the credit for one’s identity.  
 The anger felt by participants can be attenuated by validation from a third-
party (Reysen et al., 2009) or by acknowledgment by the thief (Experiment 2). In 
both cases the public identity that is displayed by the participant is validated by a 
statement that the credit for the identity remains with the victim. Instead of suggesting 
that participants are angry about someone claiming that another person is threatening 
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their distinctiveness I would suggest that the act is still a moral violation regardless of 
who validates one’s identity. As shown in Experiment 2, validation by the thief can 
attenuate anger, but the theft continues to be seen as illegitimate, negative for one’s 
image, and intentional. Further research is needed to determine if participants indeed 
believe that copying one’s identity is a moral violation, however the current studies 
provide support for this contention. 
 The meaning of identity theft was not affected by manipulating the number of 
copiers. A greater number of copiers was expected to affect participants by affording 
them the opportunity to re-evaluate the situation so they felt like leaders and by 
reducing their efficacy to change the situation. No changes in participants’ ratings of 
efficacy or feeling like a leader were observed. I interpret these findings as suggesting 
that a moral violation is driving participant anger rather than feeling that one can 
change a situation or how many people are committing that violation.  
 Overall, previous research suggested that when more than one characteristic is 
intentionally copied the victims of identity theft react with anger and a desire to 
confront the thief. Those results were supported via a replication in Experiment 1. 
The present research suggests that the threat participants perceive in an identity theft 
event may have less to do with a threat to uniqueness, and more to do with the fact 
that a moral violation against the self has occurred. Identity theft is threatening, 
although the reason for this threat appears to be due to the experience of a moral 
violation against the self. Identity theft was proposed to affect one’s ability to display 
a distinctive public identity to the world. A thief copying multiple aspects of that 
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identity violates the expectation that one can present a public identity unimpeded, and 
results in anger and a desire to confront the thief. 
Theoretical Implications 
 The present experiments add to our understanding of identity theft as a 
psychological phenomenon. As individuals strive to present a unique public identity 
(Becker, 1971; Buss, 2001; Goffman, 1959, Jones, 1964; Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 
1980) and seek validation of that identity (Baumeister, 1986; Brown, 1998; Cooley, 
1902/1964, 1964; James, 1890; Jones, 1964; Mead, 1934; Pyszczynski et al., 1997; 
Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; 1999) the appropriation of multiple self-
characteristics by another person represents an important threat to people’s 
expectation that they have the right to present a public identity without being copied. 
In effect, individuals faced with identity theft feel they are being treated in a way that 
is incongruent with their expectations of how others are supposed to react to their 
identity, and this represents a moral violation (Goffman, 1959). The theft is not 
threatening personal uniqueness per se; rather the theft upsets people’s view that they 
have a right to present their public identity as they wish and not be copied. The 
injustice of the situation coupled with the attribution that the thief is intending to 
harm the self leads to feelings of moral anger. In order to save face, following this 
intentional act, participants feel the need to confront the thief (Horney, 1982) as a 
means of managing the impression others have of them. As shown in these 
experiments, the threat of identity theft is not simply based on the loss of credit or the 
concern that valued others will view the theft. Instead, the moral violation against 
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oneself appears to be sufficient to cause moral anger. This line of research adds to 
theories regarding threats to the self and coping responses. Participants in the present 
study expressed a desire to manage their identity by confronting the thief. Further 
research is needed regarding the lengths to which individuals will go to end the 
copying.  
 Identity theft research has limited implications for marketers and advertisers. 
Individuals often copy fashion and styles from television and print media. However, 
this imitation flips the focus of the copying from the victim to the copier. The present 
research considered the victims’ perspective on being copied. While individuals do 
copy advertisers of course, the companies selling the style expect consumers to 
purchase the product (i.e., copy them). Additionally, consumers of media often copy 
actors, singers, or other famous individuals. Again, popular figures in the media have 
come to expect followers to copy them. Consideration of the implications for copying 
the media raises indicates the importance of expectations of being copied. The present 
studies do not imply that copying is ever expected. If the victim were to expect that 
the thief will copy them I suggest the situation will not be viewed as a theft and felt 
anger will be dramatically attenuated.  
Limitations 
The present experiments were limited in a number of ways. First, the 
manipulation of an increasing number of self-characteristics that I employed may 
have confounded number with permanence or importance of those self-
characteristics. In previous research (Reysen et al., 2009) and in Experiment 1 of the 
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present paper, the addition of each self-characteristic followed the pattern of shirt, 
then shirt and haircut, then shirt, haircut, and personality. The results of both 
experiments showed that participants reacted favorably when one characteristic (i.e., 
only the shirt) was copied, but unfavorably when the two (i.e., shirt and haircut) and 
three characteristics (i.e., shirt, haircut, and personality) were copied. There might be 
something specific regarding imitation of the shirt that elicits favorable results 
compared to either the hairstyle or personality alone. The shirt may hold less 
importance for the individual or may be less permanent than one’s hairstyle or 
personality. Indeed, the proposition that one’s personality is more important to one’s 
public identity than a shirt is a reasonable argument. A shirt can reasonably be 
described as less permanent than either a haircut or personality. Victim of identity 
theft can change a shirt to regain their unique public identity. However, a haircut or 
personality may last longer and it may therefore take longer before distinctiveness can 
be again returned. I am currently conducting two experiments to address the 
possibility that something other than the number of characteristics is responsible for 
the results of the present experiments.  
In the first experiment I am examining the effects of identity theft for each 
self-characteristic separately compared to the three characteristics combined. 
Participants will be randomly assigned to read about the (1) shirt, (2) haircut, (3) 
personality, or (4) all three characteristics combined being imitated by another. I 
predict that the increase in the number of characteristics is what changes participants’ 
interpretation of the event from positive to negative. Therefore, I hypothesize that 
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each characteristic alone will elicit significantly less anger from participants than the 
three characteristics condition, while each characteristic alone will not differ 
significantly from one another.  
 To test whether the number, permanence, or importance of the characteristics 
copied is the key dimension manipulated in previous identity theft experiments I am 
conducting a 2 (number: one or three) X 2 (permanence: temporary or permanent) X 
2 (importance: low or high) between-subjects experiment. The self-characteristic 
chosen for this study is a tattoo since a tattoo can be considered a public expression of 
one’s identity. Participants are selected for the study only if they currently do not 
have a tattoo, but are open to getting a tattoo in the future. Participants are asked to 
imagine that they have one or three tattoos (manipulation of number of 
characteristics). Participants are then asked to either list what the tattoo would be and 
why it is important to them (high importance) or are asked to imagine that they got 
the tattoo on a whim because all of their friends were getting tattoos (low 
importance). The copier comments that the tattoo is cool and is later seen by the 
participant with the same tattoo (or three tattoos in the high number condition). The 
copier either has a temporary tattoo (low permanence) or a real tattoo (high 
permanence). Significant main effects for number and permanence of characteristics 
are predicted, while importance is not expected to significantly affect participant 
anger. The importance of characteristics has not differed as the number of 
characteristics copied increased in past experiments. Additionally, the number and 
permanence of the characteristics copied may prove to interact such that when three 
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permanent tattoos are copied participants will express the most anger. The results of 
this experiment will aid in teasing apart aspects of the initial manipulation that may 
have been confounded.   
Second, all of the participants in the research concerning identity theft have 
been undergraduate students at the University of Kansas. Participants may react to 
identity theft with anger because their age group is especially concerned with identity 
formation while older adults might be less concerned with impression management 
(Erikson, 1956). Additionally, the desire to present a unique public identity could be 
especially strong in individualistic cultures. Further research is needed to assess if 
identity theft is similarly a threat to individuals who hold a more collectivistic 
worldview.  
Third, the experiments examining the consequences of identity theft that have 
been conducted thus far have asked participants to imagine the events occurring 
rather than actually manipulating the theft in a realistic environment. Although the 
envisage task has been successful and produced change in the dependent variables, a 
laboratory study would provide greater support for the proposition that identity theft 
is threatening. Such an experiment could be ethically possible if the theft is to a lesser 
degree than those described in the current experiments. For example, a participant 
may interact with a confederate before an experiment and share information about 
various attitudes. During the discussion the confederate could disagree with the 
participant on various opinions. Upon entering the lab the experimenter could ask for 
opinions about the same topics and the confederate could reverse his/her previous 
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opinions to match the participant’s attitudes. The number of opinions copied can be 
varied to represent identity theft.  
Fourth, the materials used in the present experiments may have been 
interpreted differently than intended. The manipulations in the present experiments 
may not have validly manipulated the construct of interest, or the scales may not have 
been appropriate to detect the constructs as intended. Explicit measures of whether or 
not participants read the vignette were not included in the present studies since the 
manipulations were straightforward. The manipulation of future residence of the 
copier, specifically when the copier was reported to be leaving the country, may have 
been misconstrued by participants. Participants may have thought that friends have 
already witnessed the theft before the copier left the country. Participants may have 
also thought that a friend was the person who relayed that information to the 
participant. If participants imagined either scenario then this would have hampered 
the operationalization of the manipulation. The residence of the copier manipulation 
was meant to manipulate the opportunity for valued others (e.g., friends) to either 
witness the theft or not. If participants imagined that others have already witnessed it 
or a friend is the person who told them about the theft this would harm the validity of 
the manipulation. However, as shown in the mediation analysis (Experiment 1) the 
relationship between the increase in the number of characteristics copied and felt 
anger is not mediated by concern that others will notice the theft. Future research is 
needed to examine the possibility that the residence manipulation was interpreted 
differently than intended.  
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Future Research 
A number of questions remain concerning the phenomenon of identity theft 
providing many opportunities for future research. For example, individuals feel they 
have a right to get angry at the intentional wrongdoing of blameworthy others (Power 
& Dalgleish, 1997). Confrontation with a blameworthy other may be socially 
acceptable after a threat to one’s public identity. Past identity theft studies have 
shown that confrontation is given the strongest endorsement by participants as their 
most likely response. What happens if confrontation does not stop the thief? For 
example, the thief could apologize, reject the victim, or lie about stopping while 
continuing to steal one’s self-characteristics. As shown in Experiment 2, 
acknowledgement by the thief attenuates participant anger, but such 
acknowledgement does not necessarily mean that the copier intends to stop. If the 
thief promises to stop copying, will participants feel they have restored their identity? 
 Additionally, although the current experiments suggest that identity theft is a 
moral violation, future research is needed to confirm whether this is indeed the case. 
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that identity theft represents a moral violation to 
participants. However, the results are correlational in nature thus an experimental 
manipulation is needed to test this proposition. Indeed, Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 
(2005) suggest that by manipulating the independent variable and the mediating 
variable separately in a sequence of experiments one can provide stronger evidence 
regarding the causal chain of events. To manipulate the moral violation, a non-moral 
comparison condition should reflect a situation where another person copies the 
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participant yet the copying is perceived as not intending to harm the participant and 
legitimate. For example, another person may be copying the participant to play the 
part of the participant in a play. As suggested by Skitka (2002), one’s identity is often 
shaped and guided by moral mandates (i.e., a clear belief in what is right and wrong). 
Events that are perceived as illegitimate are often viewed a moral violations. A 
situation in which the copier has a legitimate reason to copy the participant should be 
viewed by the participant as not violating a moral belief. If participants are asked to 
imagine that another person is copying multiple self-characteristics in order to play 
the participant in a future play or movie role this should attenuate anger.  
Conclusion 
 Identity theft is a threat to one’s public identity that has potentially powerful 
consequences. When another person intentionally appropriates two or more 
distinctive characteristics of one’s identity, participants feel a moral violation has 
occurred. The emotional response of moral anger is evoked and participants desire to 
confront the thief. The future residence of the thief and the number of thieves do not 
affect the moral anger elicited from the moral violation. Acknowledgment by the thief 
aids in reducing moral anger, although the violation continues to be viewed as 
illegitimate and harmful to one’s identity. The present studies illustrate the 
importance of the ability to display a unique public identity for the individual’s 
emotions, and the imperative to protect that public identity against theft. Additional 
research is needed to assess the strategies that people use to manage their impression 
following identity theft. 
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Manipulation 1: Number of self-characteristics stolen 
 
One characteristic stolen 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt. 
In effect, Person-A has adopted the same shirt you own. 
 
Two characteristics stolen 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, In 
effect, Person-A has adopted the same shirt you own, and a hairstyle similar to yours.  
 
Three characteristics stolen 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is 
wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants.  In addition, Person-A has adopted 
your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. In effect, Person-A has adopted 
your appearance, personality, and style. 
 
Manipulation 2: Residence of thief 
 
Foreign Country 
You later learn that Person-A is moving next week to a foreign country and will not 
be moving back.   
 










Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Happy. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Honored. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Flattered. 






Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Disrespected. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Mad. 






Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Afraid. 










Special (one of a kind). 






Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
An impostor. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Fake. 






Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Likeable. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Warm. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Approachable. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would ask Person-A for advice. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would like Person-A as a coworker. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would like Person-A as a roommate. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would like to be friends with Person-A.  
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Knowledgeable. 





Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Honorable. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Not believable. (Reversed) 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would trust Person-A to tell me the truth. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would believe what Person-A says. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Person-A is not ethical. (Reversed) 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Person-A has integrity. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
A liar. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
 
Reflect negatively on image 
 
Reflecting poorly on me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Hurting my image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Person-A is hurting my public image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
My reputation is hurt because Person-A is copying me. 








Stealing my identity. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Stealing part of who I am. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
 
Intention to copy 
 
Intending to copy me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Purposefully copying me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
 
Intention to harm 
 
Trying to hurt my public image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Trying to cause me harm. 






Justified in her/his actions. (Reversed) 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Unjust. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
The situation is unjust. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
The situation is unfair. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I believe that it is legitimate for Person-A to copy me. (Reversed) 





Person-A has an obligation to say I created the image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Person-A has an obligation to admit that I am the originator of the style. 





Other people might think that I am copying Person-A. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I am upset that I might not get credit for the image I created. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I am upset about the copying because I spent so much time and energy to create my 
public image. 





My friends would think less of me because Person-A is copying me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
People will think less of me if Person-A copies me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Other people might treat me differently now that Person-A looks like me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I am worried that my friends will think less of me because of Person-A copying me. 






Like I am in competition for my own image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
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Like I am no longer the originator of my own image. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Uncertain about my own image. 





Like a trendsetter. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
Like a leader. 





I feel I can change the situation. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I could, working by myself change the situation. 





Person-A respects my opinion. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I feel that Person-A respects me. 





I would tell Person-A to stop copying me. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would confront Person-A about copying me. 







I would tell my friends to not talk to Person-A.  
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would do all I could to avoid Person-A, and convince my friends to do the same. 





I would try to become friends with Person-A.  
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would talk with Person-A and show support.  





I would try to change my clothes and style to be distinct from Person-A.  
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
I would change my appearance to be different from Person-A.  
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
 
Importance of Characteristics 
 
My clothes are important to how I see myself. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
My hairstyle is important to how I see myself. 
Strongly Disagree       1        2        3        4        5        6        7         Strongly Agree 
 
My personality is important to how I see myself. 















Manipulation 1: Number of thieves 
 
One thief 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is 
wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants.  In addition, Person-A has adopted 
your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. In effect, Person-A has adopted 
your appearance, personality, and style. 
 
Sixteen thieves 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is 
wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants.  In addition, Person-A has adopted 
your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 16 more 
people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 16 other people 
have adopted your appearance, personality, and style. 
 
Thirty-two thieves 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is 
wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants.  In addition, Person-A has adopted 
your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 32 more 
people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 32 other people 
have adopted your appearance, personality, and style. 
appearance, personality, and style. 
 
Sixty-four thieves 
Imagine that while hanging out with some friends you meet a person. Let’s call this 
person “Person-A.” Person-A is the same gender that you are. You have not met 
Person-A before but s/he comments on how cool your shirt is and asks where you got 
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it. A couple days later you notice Person-A on campus and s/he is wearing your shirt.  
Not only that but you notice that s/he has cut her/his hair to look just like yours, is 
wearing the same shoes as you, and similar pants.  In addition, Person-A has adopted 
your mannerisms, personality, and speech pattern. Later that day you notice 64 more 
people who look and are acting just like you. In effect, Person-A and 64 other people 
have adopted your appearance, personality, and style. 
 
 
Manipulation 2: Acknowledgement of theft 
 
Acknowledgement when one thief 
When asked, Person-A says they copied the style from you. Thus, admitting that you 
are the originator. 
 
Acknowledgement when more than one thief 
When asked, Person-A, and the (16, 32, 64) other people, say they copied the style 
from you. Thus, admitting that you are the originator. 
 
 
No mention of Acknowledgement 
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